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1  Introduction 
 
Worldwide, private equity funds manage about $2.5 trillion [(TheCityUK 2010), p.2]. 
While buyouts (BO) generally account for one half to two thirds of private equity investments by 
value, venture capital (VC) accounts for the majority of investments by number of deals. The 
industry underwent an extraordinary growth in the last 15 years, increasing from $100 billion in 
1994 [(Fenn and Liang 1998), p.2]. A main driver of this change was institutional investors’ 
portfolio allocation to private equity, which increased from 3% (2%) on average in 1997 to 12% 
(6%) in 2007 for large foundations (endowments).
1 Private equity funds’ roles in the economy 
and their managerial compensation drew scrutiny among policymakers in the aftermath of the 
2007-8 financial crisis, and there is an ongoing debate about increasing taxation on private equity 
managers’ profit participation (= “carried interest”), and on the industry’s impact on innovation, 
competition, and employment. The industry has rapidly globalized in recent years, with China 
receiving the third highest investment after U.S. and U.K. in 2008-2009, followed by France and 
India.
2 Reflecting their increasingly important roles as financial intermediaries and as activist 
investors, the literature studying venture capital and other private equity (e.g., buyouts) funds has 
grown significantly in the last decade.   
In this paper we review the literature on the following topics: why professional private 
equity exists; what private equity managers do with their portfolio companies; what returns they 
earn, who earns more and why; what determines the design of contracts signed between (i) them 
and portfolio companies and (ii) them and their investors (limited partners); and how/whether 
these contractual designs affect outcomes. 
To the best of our knowledge this is the only survey paper that treats both the venture 
capital (VC) and the buyout (BO) segments as subsets of a broader, private equity industry. By 
doing so, we highlight similarities among them – what makes them both “private equity” – in 
                                                 
1 Cambridge Associates estimates.  
2 (TheCityUK 2010), p.1, Table 1.    3 
contrast to the public equity markets. Key defining characteristic is the illiquidity of the capital 
and the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders of the firms.  Often times, the 
focus in the literature is on “leveraged” in the “leveraged buyouts” – even though an LBO is just 
one of many deal structures that private equity investors employ to deploy their fund capital. We 
instead  focus  on  what  distinguishes  both  the  venture  capital  and  buyout  funds  from  other 
investment management vehicles, such as hedge funds and mutual funds, and discuss the theory 
and evidence on this “private equity” industry both as financial intermediaries and as an asset 
class.
3  
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin in Section 2 by defining private equity and then 
discussing theories that motivate the existence and economic rationale for venture capital and 
buyout specialists, respectively.  Both VCs and BO investors are financial intermediaries that 
raise funds from institutional investors and invest in private, illiquid companies. They are both 
activist investors that exercise significant control rights over their portfolio companies, and aim to 
maximize financial returns on behalf of their investors. Theories explaining the rationale for VC 
emphasize the information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and investors and contrast VCs’ 
superior information production ability vis-à-vis banks.  Theories explaining the rationale for BO 
instead assume that BO targets are public firms and either highlight the improved managerial 
incentives  of  LBO  firms  (as  compared  with  those  given  to  public  company  CEOs)  or  are 
concerned more broadly with the question of why firms go private.  Neither strand of theories 
explains why private firms become targets of BO funds.  
Section  3  reviews  the  broad  literature  that  documents  the  economic  (value-added) 
activities of VC and BO investors.  The literature identifies three groups of economic activities 
                                                 
3 For survey papers focusing on venture capital, see, for example, (Fenn and Liang 1998), (Gompers and Lerner 2001), 
and (Denis 2004), and more recently, (Kaplan and Lerner 2010) and (Krishnan and Masulis forthcoming); for survey 
papers focusing on buyouts, see, among others, (Cumming et al. 2007) and (Kaplan and Stromberg 2009). For a 
broader  survey  on  financial  intermediation  that  includes  private  equity,  see  (Chemmanur  forthcoming).  Also  see 
(Lerner forthcoming).   4 
for both VC and BO, namely: (1) pre-investment screening activities; (2) monitoring / governance 
activities during the holding period; and (3) influencing and orchestrating exiting activities.   
In Section 4 we focus on the performance of the private equity funds.  We begin by 
discussing  the  levels  of  risk-adjusted  returns.  We  then  review  the  evidence  on  performance 
persistence, and various sources of both the level of excess performance and its persistence.  The 
extant  evidence  on  excess  performance  (and  its  persistence)  in  private  equity  is  mixed;  we 
provide several reasons as to why this is and suggest futures areas for research.  
In Section 5, we discuss the strand of literature that examines features of contracts signed 
between private equity fund managers and their investors, as well as contracts signed between 
private  equity  fund  managers  and  their  portfolio  companies.  Both  VC  and  BO  funds  are 
organized as closed-end, finite-life limited partnerships, with fund managers serving as general 
partners (GPs) and investors as limited partners (LPs). Partnership agreements set management 
fees, carried interest, and (in case of BO funds) terms of transaction fees and monitoring fees. The 
agreements also restrict activities of the fund managers through various covenants. The literature 
on VC contracts has focused on the use of convertible securities, staged financing, syndication, 
voting rights, and board rights. In contrast to the extensive literature on the VC contracts, the 
theoretical literature on the BO contracts is almost nonexistent. Evidence from existing empirical 
analyses suggest that agency problems between GPs and LPs of BO funds may be exacerbated 
when  cheap  debt  is  available  and  allows  GPs  to  collect  large  fees  from  portfolio companies 
upfront in the form of transaction fees.  
Finally, in Section 6 we conclude with a summary of what we know and what still needs to 
be learned.  
2  Why Do Venture Capital and Private Equity Markets Exist? 
2.1  What is Private Equity? 
We provide a definition of private equity funds by listing the following main characteristics:    5 
1.  A PE fund is a financial intermediary, meaning that it takes the investors’ capital and invests 
it directly in portfolio companies. 
2.  A PE fund invests only in private companies. This means that once the investments are made, 
the companies cannot be immediately traded on a public exchange. 
3.  A PE fund takes an active role in monitoring and helping the companies in its portfolio. 
4.  A PE fund’s primary goal is to maximize its financial return by exiting investments through a 
sale or an initial public offering (IPO). 
Characteristic (1) defines PE funds as financial intermediaries and differentiates it from angel 
investors and private investment companies that use their own capital. Typically these funds are 
organized as limited partnerships, with the venture capitalists or the buyout firm partners acting 
as the general partners (GPs) of the fund and the investors — often pension funds, endowments 
and other institutional investors — acting as the limited partners (LPs).  Potential agency conflicts 
between  GPs  and  LPs  are  addressed  by  contractual  provisions  in  the  limited  partnership 
agreements, and have been examined in the literature, as discussed below.  
  Characteristic (2) is the most obvious defining feature of private equity and distinguishes 
it from both the traditional investment assets of stocks and bonds as well as the other alternative 
asset of hedge funds.  Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between various asset classes within 
private equity and also between private equity and other asset classes.  Within private equity, 
there are four main subclasses, of which VC and BO are the largest and most important two.  
Overlapping circles in Figure 1 indicates where the scopes of neighboring groups overlap:  for 
example, the mezzanine category comprises both growth equity (that overlaps with later-stage 
venture capital) and the subordinate debt layer of buyout transactions (which is often attached to 
some equity ownership) and thus overlaps with both venture capital and buyouts.  Distressed 
investing, on the other hand, can be thought of as a specialized segment of buyouts that target 
mature and distressed companies.     6 
In all four cases, portfolio companies of private equity funds are private companies for 
which little public information exists.  Thus, information asymmetry is thought to be far greater 
in private equity compared with investments in public companies that must file regular reports 
with the SEC and also are often covered by Wall Street analysts. As a result, portfolio values of 
private equity funds are not marked to market and fund returns are not finalized until the end of 
the funds’ lifetime. In contrast, while some hedge funds participate in private equity transactions 
(especially larger companies that buyouts and distressed investors invest in), they are primarily 
investors in publicly traded assets such as stocks and bonds and their portfolios are marked to 
market.   
  Characteristic (3) is central to the raison d’être of private equity — and potentially a key 
determinant of a given PE fund’s performance. While all “active” investment fund managers — 
mutual funds, hedge funds, and private equity funds — select their stocks and are evaluated on 
their ability to pick winners, not all of them actively influence actions of the management of the 
companies they invest in. Except for large blockholders who gain seats on the boards of public 
companies, public company investors’ ability to influence the management is severely limited.  In 
contrast, private equity investors often condition their investments on contractual provisions, such 
as board seats, veto rights, and various contingent control rights, that enable them to influence the 
actions  of  the  management  while  they  hold  their  investments.    In  Section  3,  we  provide  an 
extensive  review  of  the  literature’s  findings  on  these  monitoring  /  value-adding  activities 
performed by PE fund managers.    
  Finally, since PE funds are financial intermediaries, they need some mechanism to give 
money back to their investors, which gives rise to Characteristic (4). Exits can occur through an 
IPO, with a subsequent sale of the PE stake in the open market, through a sale of the company to 
another investor (especially to another BO fund), or through the sale of the company to a larger 
company.  The  requirement  to  exit  and  the  focus  on  financial  return  differentiates  PE  from   7 
strategic investments done by large corporations. While corporations are active both in VC and 
BO markets, their investment criteria are different from professional PE because of the lack of 
need for exits and greater emphasis on synergy with their existing operations.  
  To summarize, PE funds differ from both mutual funds and hedge funds in that they 
invest in illiquid, private companies, and differ from corporations in that they are required to 
return money to investors within a finite investment horizon and thus need to focus on targets 
with a clear path to exits.  These functional differences are reflected in the ways PE funds are 
organized, in contrast to hedge funds and mutual funds, and as described in Table 1.  PE funds 
have a finite life — typically 10 years — and a fixed fund size that is determined at the time of 
the fund inception. Both hedge funds and mutual funds are open-ended and do not have a finite 
fund lifetime.  Within the fund lifetime, investors in PE funds must commit to illiquidity of up to 
10 years, unlike hedge funds and mutual funds, both of which allow redemptions on demand, 
subject to some waiting period.  
Because of the illiquidity and the long-term nature of PE investments, reinvestments are 
not permitted or restricted to a modest fraction of the fund size; in contrast, hedge fund and 
mutual  fund  investors  are  offered  options  to  automatically  reinvest  any  dividends  and 
distributions from funds on an on-going basis.  PE fees are often highest first and decline in later 
years, because successful managers are expected to raise follow-on funds with new fee streams; 
hedge fund and mutual fund fees are flat percentages of assets under management, so that total 
fees would rise over time as assets grow.  And finally, despite the common perception, hedge 
fund and PE fund carried interest are earned quite differently.  In hedge funds, carry is a fixed 
percentage (usually 20%) of the market value of the portfolio in excess of cost basis, and can be 
earned each year as long as the former exceeds the latter, subject to high watermarks. In contrast, 
carried interest in PE is earned only on realized basis — i.e., only if investments are exited and 
cumulative exit values exceed the contractually specified threshold amount.  Since exits typically   8 
are concentrated in the latter half of the funds’ life, PE managers often wait for many years before 
they earn any carry from their funds. 
2.2  The Economic Rationale for Professional Venture Capitalists 
Several theoretical papers offer economic rationale for existence of VC funds as defined above. 
(Chan 1983) shows that, in a market setting with imperfect information and positive search costs, 
uninformed  investors  and  informed  entrepreneurs  in  equilibrium  are  unable  to  overcome  the 
lemons problem and investors earn lower returns by investing in alternative projects. Venture 
capitalists as financial intermediaries may evolve as informed screening agents that improve the 
allocation of resources and welfare of the investors. (Campello and Da Matta 2010) provide an 
equilibrium analysis of prospective LPs’ demand for GPs’ service, quality of GPs’ screening 
activities, and payoffs GPs derive from running VC funds.  
  Venture  capital  funds  are  not  the  only  financial  intermediaries  that  bridge  between 
investors and small businesses; banks also provide the intermediary function for small businesses.   
(Ueda 2004) offers an explanation for why VCs and banks coexist in an economy.  The key trade-
off  between  the  two  choices  is  that  while  VCs’  evaluations  of  the  project  quality  are  more 
accurate, they also use the threat of expropriation to extract rent from the entrepreneurs.  The 
model explains why projects financed by VCs have less collateral, high growth, high risk, and 
high profitability, and why VC markets are more active in markets where intellectual property is 
better protected.    
  (Winton and Yerramilli 2008) is another paper that compares venture capital financing 
with bank financing. While (Ueda 2004) focuses on the ex ante screening ability differential 
between VCs and banks, (Winton and Yerramilli 2008) model follow-on financing decisions, thus 
incorporating ex post (costly) monitoring into their analysis. In addition to the standard continue-
or-liquidate decision, the model allows for an aggressive or a conservative continuation choice, 
which makes continuation strategy risky in the sense of cash flow volatility between the two   9 
choices. VCs have better ability to monitor, but demand higher returns because they impose 
illiquidity on their investors; in contrast, banks are less skilled at monitoring, but demand lower 
returns  from  entrepreneurs  because  they  themselves  face  lower  funding  cost  by  exposing 
themselves to liquidity shocks.  VCs are optimal only if firms face highly risky and positively 
skewed  project  cash  flows,  with  low  probability  of  success,  low  liquidation  value,  and  high 
returns if successful, and if they face highly volatile cash flows across two continuation strategies.   
2.3  The Economic Rationale for Professional Buyout Investor 
The extant literature that relates to the economic rationale for existence of buyout investors has 
focused exclusively on public-to-private transactions, where formerly publicly traded companies 
are taken over by buyout investors and delisted. In one strand, the agency conflicts between 
shareholders  and  the  management  of  public  firms  are  emphasized,  with  leveraged  buyouts 
proposed  as  solutions.  In  another  strand  of  this  literature,  information  and  liquidity  are 
emphasized as main factors governing the firm’s decision to go private.  
2.3.1  Jensen’s Theory of Leveraged Buyouts as Governance Mechanism  
In a series of articles [e.g., (Jensen and Meckling 1976), (Jensen 1986), (Jensen 1989), (Jensen 
2007)],  Jensen  and  his  co-authors  advance  a  hypothesis  that  free  cash  flows  in  public  firms 
present serious agency problems and that LBOs mitigate these conflicts between managers and 
shareholders. Private benefits of control (and higher compensation associated with larger firm 
size) induce public firm mangers to engage in empire building and misuse free cash flows, both at 
the expense of shareholders.  Jensen argues that debt reduces agency costs of free cash flows and 
disciplines the managers, and that the growth in popularity of LBOs during the 1980’s was partly 
due to this control function of debt. Moreover, larger managerial ownership and the monitoring 
and controlling functions of BO investors, combined with the discipline of debt, lead to better-run 
firms and improved operational performance.    10 
Studying a sample of 263 going private transactions between 1980 and 1987, (Lehn and 
Poulsen  1989)  find  empirical  evidence  in  support  of  Jensen’s  free  cash  flow  hypothesis: 
undistributed cash flows are significantly related to a firm’s decision to go private, and premiums 
paid to stockholders are significantly related to undistributed cash flows.
4  
2.3.2  Information and Liquidity as Critical Determinants of Public Status 
 
(Mehran  and  Peristiani  2010)  empirically  examine  a  sample  of  companies  that  went  private 
between 1990 and 2007 and argue that a primary reason behind the decision to de-list was a 
failure to attract financial visibility and investor interest.  Firms with declining analyst coverage, 
institutional ownership, and low stock turnover were more likely to go private and opted to do so 
sooner.  Similar results are reported by (Bharath and Dittmar 2010), who study a sample of going-
private transactions from 1980 to 2004. Both studies compare determinants of going private for 
those firms that were acquired by BO funds and those that were taken over by other investors 
(e.g., management and other private companies), and find that they go private for similar reasons. 
For example, non-LBO going-private transactions are more likely if the firms have less analyst 
coverage and higher free cash flow, as are LBO transactions. Thus, the findings in these studies 
explain why firms go private in general more than why firms specifically choose to go private 
under the buyout fund ownership.
5   
2.3.3    Economic Rationale of Private-to-Private Buyouts 
 
While the largest buyout investments are often public-to-private deals (with high leverage) and 
they tend to receive heightened attention from media due to their size and high profile, the vast 
majority of buyout targets are private firms and these transactions often employ little to moderate 
leverage. For example, (Stromberg 2007) reports that, of 21,397 buyout transactions between 
                                                 
4 Also see (Kaplan 1991), (Cotter and Peck 2001), (Denis 1992), (Lehn et al. 1990), (Hite and Vetsuypens 1989), 
(Denis 1994), (Gupta and Rosenthal 1991), and (Muscarella and Vetsuypens 1990).  
5 But also see (DeAngelo et al. 1984), (Slovin et al. 1991), which examine management buyouts from the 1980’s and 
find that targets who receive bids with an outside buyout investor experience significantly higher returns than those 
without. Also see (Masulis and Thomas 2009).     11 
1970-2007, public-to-private transactions account only for 6.7% of all transactions and 28% of 
firm values acquired. Thus, neither the high leverage nor the going private decision is a necessary 
ingredient of a buyout investment. To the best of our knowledge, little prior theoretical work 
exists  that  systematically  analyzes  the  economic  roles  played  by  private-to-private  buyout 
investors or buyouts where high leverage is not a key ingredient. Indeed, in a recent empirical 
study of private-to-private buyout transactions, (Chung 2009) argues that agency costs of free 
cash flows is unlikely to explain the buyouts of privately held targets, as ownership is already 
concentrated  in  these  firms  prior  to  buyouts.  Moreover,  these  firms  grow  substantially  after 
buyouts. These empirical findings by Stromberg, Chung and others suggest that more research is 
needed to understand the economic rationale of non-public-to-private buyout transactions.  
3  What do Venture Capitalists and Buyout Investors do?  
 
As discussed in the previous section, private equity investors are activist, hands-on investors 
whose goal is to maximize financial returns on behalf of their limited partners. The literature 
focuses on three main groups of activities:  (i) pre-investment screening activities; (ii) monitoring 
and governance activities during the holding period; and (iii) exiting activities. Both VC- and 
BO-backing are associated with improved governance practice at the investee firms including 
more independent and hands-on boards and higher earnings quality.    
3.1  Economic Activities of Venture Capitalists 
 
VC (and BO) firms serve as general partners of the fund they run.  Since these funds have a finite 
lifetime, typically 10-years long, firms raise new funds every 3-5 years and at a given point in 
time  mature  firms  are  managing  two  or  more  consecutive  funds.  Funds  that  are  5  years  or 
younger take up more of general partners’ time and efforts, as such funds are in their “investment 
periods” — periods during which the GPs of the fund search and screen hundreds of prospective 
startups before committing capital to a select portfolio of 15-25 companies.  Funds that are older 
than 5 years are in the growth and harvesting stage — a period during which the GPs’ main work   12 
is to monitor and provide follow-on funds as necessary and conditional on achieving milestones, 
assist the portfolio companies in value-adding activities, and finally help prepare the companies 
for  exit  events,  either  via  IPOs  or  acquisitions.    For  a  number  of  companies  that  are  not 
sufficiently successful to warrant profitable exits, this is also a period in which VCs get involved 
in restructuring or shutting down the operations.  
  (Gorman and Sahlman 1989)  report 49 responses to a questionnaire mailed (this is pre-
email era!) to 100 venture capitalists in 1984.  They provide the first evidence on how VCs 
actually  spend  their  days.    For  example,  VCs  (who  responded)  spend  about  half  their  time 
monitoring nine portfolio investments; of these, five are companies on whose boards they sit.  As 
board members, a VC typically devotes 80 hours of on-site time and 30 hours of phone time per 
year  in  direct  contact  with  each  company.  Fundraising,  strategic  analysis,  and  management 
recruitment  are  the  most  commonly  mentioned  activities  that  they  perform.  The  number  of 
companies VCs monitor seems to have changed little since 1984: (Metrick and Yasuda 2010a) 
report that, for a sample of funds raised between 1993-2006, a mean (median) VC fund invests in 
24 (20) companies and has 5 (4) partners, suggesting that a partner at a typical VC firm running 
two funds on average would monitor close to 10 firms at a given point in time.
6 
  How do VCs screen startups before committing capital, and what kind of companies do 
they tend to fund? (Kaplan et al. 2009) examine 50 VC-backed companies that eventually went 
public,  and  find  that  business  lines  remain  stable  from  early  business  plan  to  IPO,  while 
management is frequently replaced.  Therefore, the results suggest that the business (idea) rather 
than the management team should be the key screening criteria for investments in startups.  The 
evidence of frequent management turnover is in line with (Hellmann 1998), which explains that 
                                                 
6 For example, a hypothetical XZY Venture Partners with 4 partners may have their first fund, XYZ I, that is 7 years 
old and has 20 portfolio companies, and another fund XYZ II that is 4 years and nearly fully funded, with another 20 
companies.  (20+20)/4 = 10.    13 
in equilibrium founders voluntarily relinquish control of the firm so that VCs are incented to 
search for a superior management team without fear of holdup.
7   
In an empirical study of a large, comprehensive small business dataset, (Puri and Zarutskie 
2010) find that VC-backed companies tend to be younger, faster-growing, and larger compared to 
non-VC-backed companies. Thus, scalability is an important criterion that VCs use to screen 
prospective  investments’  market  potential,  while  profitability  is  not.  The  tendency  for  faster 
growth  of  VC-backed  firms  may  also  contribute  to  the  higher  CEO  turnover  rate:  rare  are 
individuals who have the talent and skill sets of founder-CEOs of startups as well as those of 
professional managers running multi-billion dollar companies.  
  Do  VCs  fund  high-growth  companies,  or  do  companies  funded  by  VCs  grow  fast? 
According to (Inderst and Mueller 2009), the answer seems to be a little bit of both. The paper 
shows that, in a competitive product market, new ventures financed by VCs (active investors) 
may prey on rivals by “strategically overinvesting” early on, and dominate their industry peers in 
the long run. The value of VCs is greater in highly competitive industries as well as in industries 
with network effects and economies of scope, as is typical for many “new economy” industries.
8 
Collectively, these papers support the view that a VC business model works the best in newly 
emerging markets that can support fast growth and large scale, and VCs strategically focus their 
efforts and attain skills that enable them to identify strong business ideas in such markets and 
push them to achieve high growth in a relatively short period time for attractive financial returns.   
  Once VCs find and fund their portfolio companies, how do they monitor / influence them, 
who  receive  more  monitoring  and  why,  and  is  monitoring  valuable  to  the  companies?  VC 
investments  are  often  staged,  and  by  structuring  investments  to  be  dispensed  over  many 
incremental rounds, each conditional on some measure of performance, rather than an upfront 
                                                 
7 (Hellman and Puri 2002), (Baker and Gompers 2003), and (Hochberg 2003) find that replacement of founder-CEOs is 
more likely and/or occurs faster at VC-backed companies compared with non-VC-backed firms.  
8 In line with this view of VCs’ comparative advantage, (Hellmann and Puri 2000) find that first-mover firms are more 
likely to obtain venture capital than follower (imitator) firms.   14 
payment  for  the  whole  project,  VCs  exercise  their  rights  to  monitor,  evaluate  the  interim 
performance and (and if found unpromising) abandon the project mid-course. Consistent with the 
monitoring  role  of  staged  financing,  (Gompers  1995)  analyzes  a  sample  of  794  VC-backed 
companies’ investment history and finds that firms with higher levels of agency costs (measured 
by, e.g., the ratio of intangible to total assets, the market-to-book ratio, and R&D intensity) are 
monitored more frequently, i.e., durations between their investment rounds are more frequent.  
Venture capitalists appear to influence the way in which their portfolio companies are run, 
staffed, and funded. Using a dataset on Silicon Valley start-ups, (Hellmann and Puri 2002) find 
that VC-backed companies are more professionalized, as measured by human resource policies, 
adoption of stock option plans, and hiring of a marketing VP. Using a sample of European VC 
deals, (Bottazzi et al. 2008) find that venture capitalists with more prior business experience are 
more  hands-on  investors,  helping  with  recruiting  and  fundraising  for  and  interacting  more 
frequently with their portfolio companies.
9 Both (Baker and Gompers 2003) and (Hochberg 2003) 
find that VC backing is associated with more independent boards. (Lerner 1995) reports that 
board representations increase around CEO turnover and is higher the more distant the companies 
and VCs are from each other. (Cornelli et al. 2010), using East European VC investment data, 
document  disciplinary  roles  (manager  evaluation  and  firing)  played  by  VC-backed  company 
boards. Moreover, (Hochberg 2003) also finds that VC-backed IPO firms exhibit lower earnings 
management than non-VC-backed counterparts.
10  
  Several studies document the economic roles of VCs in innovation. (Kortum and Lerner 
2000),  for  example,  find  that  increases  in  VC  funding  in  an  industry  is  associated  with 
significantly higher patenting rates, while controlling for the effect of unobservable arrivals of 
technological opportunities that affect both VC activities and patenting by using instruments. 
Patents filed by VC-backed companies are more valuable (cited and litigated more frequently) 
                                                 
9 The activities documented in these more recent papers echo those from (Sahlman 1990). 
10 See similar evidence for BO-backed companies in (Katz 2009).    15 
than those filed by non-VC-backed companies. (Hellmann and Puri 2000) find that VC backing is 
associated with a significant reduction in the time to bring a product to market and that this is 
especially true for firms with first-mover positions in the markets.  Finally, (Tian and Wang 
2010) find evidence that firms backed by VCs with higher tolerance for failure (measured by the 
VCs’  willingness  to  keep  funding  a  startup  conditional  on  not  meeting  milestones)  stay 
innovative long after VCs exit as investors.
11 Overall, the evidence is strong that VCs pour funds 
into  innovator  firms  (who  present  the  greatest  “homerun”  opportunities)  and  push  for  their 
dominance as first movers in new markets [but see (Caselli et al. 2009) for a contrary European 
evidence].
12  
Some studies focus on VCs’ roles as managers of a portfolio of firms that may collaborate 
as well as compete with each other. (Lindsey 2008) provides evidence that strategic alliances are 
more  frequent  among  companies  sharing  a  common  venture  capitalist,  and  that  the  effect  is 
concentrated in alliances in which contracting problems are more pronounced [also see (Gompers 
and Xuan 2009)]. (Inderst et al. 2007) argue that, by staging funding and rationing a fixed amount 
of capital (bound by the size of committed capital) among a portfolio of companies in later stage 
financing,  VCs  not  only  improve  their  bargaining  power  but  also  enhance  entrepreneurs’ 
incentives to outperform their peer portfolio companies. 
Given these highly specialized, hands-on activities that VCs perform, it is not surprising 
that the most common backgrounds VC partners have are some combination of technology / 
science and business. According to (Wieland 2009), among the 125 partners from 15 VC firms, 
60 percent of them hold a degree in science or engineering; particularly common is a bachelor’s 
degree in engineering, which 44 percent of VCs hold.  The most common postgraduate degrees 
held by VCs are MBA degrees — held by 62 percent of them.  78 percent of them have worked in 
                                                 
11 In a related paper, (Gompers et al. 2005) find that public companies that were once VC-backed firms themselves 
spawn VC-backed entreprensuers at a significantly higher rate than others.   
12 Using a sample of 37 Italian VC-backed IPO firms and matched pairs of 37 non-VC-backed IPO firms, (Caselli et al. 
2009) find that VCs choose more innovative firms at the time of backing, but post-transactions VC-backed firms do not 
pursue more innovative business plans.    16 
the IT or health care sector, 37 percent have worked as entrepreneurs in startups, and 38 percent 
as line manager at a listed firm.
13  
There is some empirical evidence that capital markets perceive VC monitoring (as proxied 
by VC reputation) to enhance firm values.  For example, examining a sample of VC-backed IPO 
firms between 1978 and 1987, (Barry et al. 1990) find that firms backed by high reputation VCs 
(as measured by, e.g., VC age and the number of past IPOs) experience lower underpricing for 
their IPOs. (Krishnan et al. forthcoming) find that more reputable VCs stay involved longer after 
IPOs and contribute to better long-run performance of the firms.   
Finally, VCs seem to influence timing of exit events in some cases.
14 (Masulis and Nahata 
forthcoming) provide evidence that VCs face pressure to have liquidity events towards the end of 
their funds’ life; thus, M&A announcements of firms backed by VC funds near the end of fund 
life are associated with significantly higher acquirer returns, suggesting these are fire sales.  (Puri 
and Zarutskie 2010) also document time-varying survival rates of VC-backed companies: they are 
higher  relative  to  non-VC-backed  firms  in  the  first  four  years  after  receiving  funding,  but 
conditional on surviving past this point, are lower in the subsequent periods.  
3.2  Economic Activities of Buyout Investors 
In one of the early papers examining the first wave of buyouts in the 1980’s, (Kaplan 1991) 
document status changes of LBO target firms over time and find that LBOs are neither short-lived 
nor permanent: Median target firms spend about 7 years remaining private. (Stromberg 2007), 
(Guo et al. forthcoming), and (Lopez de Silanes et al. 2010), using data sets that involve more 
recent BO transactions, report median holding periods of 9, 4, and 4 years, respectively.  
  What types of firms are likely to become buyout targets? (Opler and Titman 1993) find 
that, consistent with free-cash-flow theory, LBO target firms have both low Tobin’s q and high 
                                                 
13 Similar findings are reported by (Zarutskie 2010) for first-time VC partners. Also see (Gompers et al. 2009).   
14 Also see (Bayar and Chemmanur forthcoming) for a theoretical analysis of IPO vs. acquisition exit decisions by 
entrepreneurs and VCs.    17 
cash flows relative to non-target firms, and are more diversified.  Firms with large expected costs 
of  financial  distress  (measured  as  those  with  high  R&D  expenditures)  are  less  likely  to  do 
LBOs.
15   
With respect to post-investment monitoring activities of buyout investors, (Cotter and 
Peck 2001) find that buyout specialists use more long-term debt and are more active monitors of 
firms and their monitoring roles substitute for tighter debt terms in motivating managers to run 
their firms efficiently.  In a case study, (Baker and Wruck 1989) examine the LBO of O.M. Scott 
& Sons and document that the adoption of a strong incentive compensation plan, a reorganization 
and decentralization of decision making, and the relationships between managers, PE sponsors, 
and the board of directors were as important as the disciplining power of heavy debt load and 
management equity ownership in improving performance of the firm.
16 
More  recently,  (Kaplan  et  al.  forthcoming)  examine  the  relationship  between  CEO 
characteristics and subsequent performance of BO portfolio companies and find that resoluteness 
and  execution  skills,  but  not  communication  and  interpersonal  skills,  translate  to  good 
performance. (Acharya et al. 2009) study a hand-collected sample of boards of U.K., BO-backed 
companies and find that they play a markedly active role “leading” the company strategy and 
operations whereas boards of non-BO backed, plc companies play a more remote, supervisory 
and monitoring role. (Cornelli and Karakas 2008) study UK firms that went through public-to-
private transactions and find (1) significant reduction in board size, (2) replacement of outside 
directors with BO firm employees, (3) greater BO firm presence at boards of companies requiring 
more time and efforts (e.g., firms that experience CEO change at the time of transactions), and 
overall high turnover both of directors and CEOs during investment periods.
17 Focusing on a 
                                                 
15 Also see (Lehn and Poulsen 1989), (Lehn et al. 1990), and (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1987).  
16 Also see (Denis 1994) for an in-depth case study comparison of an LBO vs. a leveraged recapitalization. 
17 Consistent with a tighter leash with which BO-backed company executives are managed, (Edgerton 2010) finds that 
LBO target firms significantly reduce the size of their corporate jet fleets compared with those of comparable public 
firms. (Brown et al. 2009) find that LBO target firms bargain harder with suppliers post transactions. The effect is 
absent in cases of leverage recapitalizations; thus, it is the change in organizational form rather than leverage that lead 
to price concessions from suppliers.   18 
sample of public-debt issuing private firms that later have IPOs, (Katz 2009) finds that BO-
backed firms have higher earnings quality than those that do not have BO-sponsorship, engage 
less  in  earnings  management,  and  report  more  conservatively  both  before  and  after  the  IPO. 
These findings are consistent with tighter monitoring and reputational considerations exhibited by 
BO investors.  
  One  particularly  controversial  issue  is  how  buyout  investors  affect  employment, 
productivity, and investment activities at the portfolio companies.
18 (Davis et al. 2008) find that 
U.S. Buyout target firms reduce more pre-existing jobs relative to controls both before and after 
the transactions, but create more jobs at new establishments they open after transactions. Higher 
old-job  destructions  of  buyout  target  firms  are  driven  by  service  sector  firms  rather  than 
manufacturing firms. (Harris et al. 2005) find that U.K. buyout target plants are less productive 
pre-transaction  and  experience  a  substantial  increase  in  productivity  after  a  buyout,  due  to 
reduction in labor intensity of production via outsourcing of intermediate goods and materials. 
(Bernstein et al. 2010) analyze the impact of buyouts on industry performance across nations 
(U.S., U.K., and continental Europe) and find that high BO activity is associated with faster 
growth  in  productivity  and  employment.  (Lerner et al.  forthcoming)  find  that  LBOs  do  not 
decrease patenting activity of target firms, patents applied for by target firms are more cited, and 
are  more  concentrated  in  the  most  important  and  prominent  areas  of  companies’  innovative 
portfolios. Overall, evidence suggests that buyout target firms become strategically more focused, 
which lead to existing job loss where inefficiency existed, and at the same time result in focused 
expansions and job creations in areas of their core strengths.  
4  Performance:  Risk-adjusted Returns, Persistence, and Sources of Performance 
 
Both VC and BO funds make illiquid investments in private companies and fund returns are 
reported  either  as  IRRs  or  value  multiples,  not  time-weighted  returns.  At  the  deal  level, 
                                                 
18 Also see (Lichtenberg and Siegel 1990) and (Long and Ravenscraft 1993) for earlier evidence.    19 
investment return realizations are low frequency events, and may not be observed for deals that 
stagnate  and  are  never  cashed  out.  These  features  of  PE  investments  make  it  challenging  to 
analyze their performance using standard risk-adjustment methods.     
  VC  and  BO  asset  classes  also  share  similarities  in  the  reported  findings  about  their 
performances.  While neither asset class appears to significantly outperform public benchmarks 
after  risk  adjustments,  there  seems  to  be  some  performance  persistence  among  firms.  These 
findings contrast sharply with findings in the mutual fund literature. The persistence is stronger in 
VC than in BO, and some explanations have been offered for the difference.   
4.1  Evidence on Returns 
 
Data  on  investment  performance  of  VC  and  BO  investments  can  be  gathered  either  at  the 
portfolio company level, or at the fund level. While the fund-level data have the advantage of 
being net of fund fees and carry, aggregation at the fund level also implies loss of information 
about  the  timing  of  individual  investments  and  exits.  Loss  of  information  is  particularly 
problematic for cases of investment write-offs, as researchers do not observe when the funds and 
their investors incur actual losses.  In contrast, deal-level data allow researchers to more explicitly 
control for selection bias arising from lack of observations for final outcomes of unsuccessful 
investments.  However, the deal-level data may suffer from incompleteness, as documented by 
(Kaplan et al. 2002) and (Maats et al. 2010).   Furthermore, studies using deal-level data are often 
restricted (due to data limitations) to firms that underwent IPOs and/or (in case of buyouts) firms 
that were publicly traded prior to transactions, which are a small and select subset of all PE target 
firms. The best studies in this area have either made use of a novel dataset, developed a model 
that helps overcome the data problem, or both.   
We first review the papers studying cash flows data in and out of VC and BO funds, and 
then review the evidence based on company-level data. Finally, we review evidence based on VC 
and BO index returns, which have been developed based on both fund-level and deal-level data.    20 
4.1.1  Fund-level performance 
 
Cash flow data for fund partnerships are typically reported quarterly, and funds aggregate and net 
out any opposing cash flows that occur during a given measurement period.  For example, a fund 
that receives a quarterly management fees of $5M and a capital call of $10M, and books an exit 
distribution to LP of $40M will have a net cash outflow of -$25M to the investors that period, and 
conversely the investors (limited partners) experience a net cash inflow of +$25M.
19  Since this 
observed  net  cash  flow  is  already  net  of  fees  and  carry,  fund-level  performance  measures 
represent net returns.    
Researchers face two primary challenges when using fund-level cash flows data to assess 
risk and returns in private equity. First, this type of data is confidential and is not easily accessible 
for research use. Recently, a small number of researchers have overcome this obstacle and gained 
access to data, either from a single large investor or from vendors such as Venture Economics or 
Preqin.  Second,  because  investments  are  illiquid  and  individual  project  returns  are  not  fully 
realized until after the end of the fund life, usually ten years, it is not easy to measure risk 
(“beta”) at the fund level, using standard time-series correlations with the market and other factor 
returns. Existing studies’ approach to address this data limitation varies, though all employ some 
version of market-return adjustment with an effective assumption of beta = 1.
20 
Existing studies offer somewhat mixed conclusions about the fund-level performance of 
private equity relative to public equity markets. Using a large fund-level cash flow dataset of 
private equity funds provided by Venture Economics, (Kaplan and Schoar 2005) find that net-of-
fee returns of private equity funds (both venture capital and buyout) approximately equal the S&P 
500, in the sense that discounting fund inflows and outflows using the same-period S&P 500 
returns and dividing the sum of discounted present values of outflows by the sum of discounted 
                                                 
19 In this example, there may or may not be a carry payment to the fund manager (general partners); but this amount (if 
any) is already netted out of the total exit distributions and is reflected in the exit distribution to LPs.  
20 Beta estimates obtained using deal-level data or index returns (reported in Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.4) suggest that this 
assumption is too low for VC, whereas it may be reasonable for BO.    21 
present values of inflows yields a ratio of approximately one (“public market equivalent”, or 
PME). The inference is made by focusing on 746 funds which are mostly funds started before 
1995 (and thus are fully liquidated).   
  In contrast, (Ljungqvist and Richardson 2003) find that the average net-of-fee IRR of 
their sample funds is 19.8 percent, 5.7 percent higher than the IRR of a simulated investment in 
the S&P 500 index under an identical time schedule of cash outflows (14.1 percent). They assign 
industry-adjusted  risk  measures  to  individual  portfolio  companies  and  find  that  the  excess 
performance results are robust to this further refinement on risk-adjustments.
21 Ljungqvist and 
Richardson obtain data from a single large investor (LP); thus their sample is somewhat smaller 
— the core sample is 73 funds raised between 1981 and 1993 — and skews toward large, buyout 
funds  and  away  from  venture  capital  funds.    Their  sample  also  outperforms  the  Venture 
Economics population of funds in eight out of eleven vintage years.  Thus their results may be 
more representative of buyout fund performance than venture capital fund performance.  
  (Jones and Rhodes-Kropf 2003) differ from other studies reviewed here in that they use 
GP estimates of value changes rather than realized returns to estimate quarterly private equity 
returns. Using the Venture Economics data, they find the beta of 1.80 and the annualized alpha of 
4.68% for VC funds, and the beta of 0.66 and the alpha of 0.72% per annum for BO funds.   
  (Phalippou and Gottschalg 2009) start with a dataset similar to that used by Kaplan and 
Schoar, but make several adjustments to the measurement of the PME
22 and conclude that the 
performance reported by previous research is overstated. They argue, in particular, that (i) the 
funds included in Venture Economics perform better than those funds excluded from Venture 
Economics  but  whose  deal-based  performance  is  available  from  VentureXpert,  a  database  of 
                                                 
21 The refinement implicitly assumes that BO portfolio companies have similar leverage to their industry peers, which 
have levered equity beta of around 1. On the one hand, to the extent that BO portfolio companies are more highly 
levered, this may account for some of the reported excess performance here. (Axelson et al. 2010) show that LBO 
firms’ leverage levels are not explained well by those of their public-market industry peers. On the other hand, BO beta 
estimates using index returns and reported in Section 4.1.4 are about 1. Also see (Kaplan and Stein 1990).  
22 Phalippou and Gottshalg (2009) use the term Profitability Index (PI) to refer to this measure; however, because 
Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) use the term PI to refer to a slightly different performance measure, for consistency 
we refer to it as PME, as defined in Kaplan and Schoar (2005).     22 
portfolio company-level investments;  (ii) Net-Asset-Value of unrealized investments tend to be 
inflated and should be written-off when calculating fund distributions in the last period of the 
fund’s life; and (iii) it is more conservative to use present values of fund inflows as weights rather 
than the size of committed capital, because poorly-performing funds tend to invest faster, and 
thus have larger present values of cost basis (inflows) than better-performing funds, which tend to 
invest more slowly, do. After implementing these three adjustments, they show that the PME of 
their broadened sample is reduced from 1.01 to 0.88.   
  Finally, (Driessen et al. 2009) develop and apply a GMM-style methodology to a fund-
level  cash  flows  dataset  consisting  of  958  mature  private  equity  funds.    Their  estimation 
methodology is based on a moment condition that equates the expected discounted value of the 
cost basis of an investment in a portfolio company to the expected discounted value of the exit 
value of the investment; in implementation, because the deal-level cash flow data is not available, 
the method is applied to the fund-level cash flows data.  Driessen et al. find a market beta of 3.21 
and significant underperformance for VC funds, and a low beta (0.33) and mixed evidence on 
performance  for  BO  funds.  While  the  VC  result  is  similar  in  magnitude  to  (Korteweg  and 
Sorensen forthcoming), the BO result is at odds with studies using index returns (reported in 
Section 4.1.4).     
 
4.1.2   Deal-level performance: Venture Capital 
 
(Brav  and  Gompers  1997)  compare  the  long-run  performance  of  VC-backed  IPOs  and 
nonventure-backed IPOs completed between 1972-1992 and find that VC-backed IPOs generally 
perform better than nonventure-backed IPOs.  They identify the smallest nonventure-backed IPOs 
as  the  main  drivers  of  long-run  underperformance  of  IPO  firms  —  these  firms  significantly 
underperform benchmarks and in the Fama-French 3-factor model.  In contrast, VC-backed IPOs 
do not underperform.     23 
Two papers develop econometric methods that measure risk and return of VC investments 
at the deal level while correcting for sample selection.
23 (Cochrane 2005) measures the mean, 
standard deviation, alpha, and beta of VC investments, using a maximum likelihood estimate that 
corrects for selection bias.  The selection-corrected mean arithmetic return is 59%, with the mean 
arithmetic alpha of 32%. Volatility is 89%.  While high, these figures are generally comparable to 
those  of  the  smallest  NASDAQ  stocks  in  the  estimation  period.    (Korteweg  and  Sorensen 
forthcoming) develop a model that corrects for the higher frequency of observations for better 
performing investments and obtain beta estimates of VC investments in the range of two to three, 
much  higher  than  previously  reported  in  the  literature.  Similarly,  VC  betas  close  to  two  are 
obtained when regressing VC index returns on contemporaneous and lagged market returns and 
summing over the coefficients, as discussed in Section 4.1.4.     
4.1.3   Deal-level performance: Buyouts 
(Andrade  and  Kaplan  1998)  find  that  buyout  transactions  in  the  1980’s  created  value 
despite high leverage and subsequent financial distress [also see (Kaplan 1989a) and (Kaplan 
1989b)]. (Guo et al. forthcoming), in a study examining buyout transactions completed between 
1990-2006, find that they earned high financial returns on average and had operating performance 
comparable  to  or  slightly  succeeding  benchmark  firms.    Tax  benefits  of  leverage,  multiple 
expansion (market timing), and operating gains equally contributed to the results. 
(Holthausen and Larcker 1996), in an early study of the first wave of buyouts focused on 
reversed LBOs, find that these firms’ operating performance is significantly better than their 
industry peers for the first four years after the IPO events, while there is no evidence of abnormal 
common  stock  performance.  They,  however,  also  document  some  evidence  of  a  decline  in 
performance  over  time.  Similar  improvements  in  operating  performance  are  also  reported  in 
(Muscarella  and  Vetsuypens  1990).  Echoing  these  earlier  findings,  (Cao  and  Lerner  2009) 
                                                 
23 Also see (Gompers and Lerner 1997).   24 
examine post-IPO long-run performance of reversed LBOs completed between 1981 and 2003 
and find that they perform as well as or better than other IPOs and the stock market as a whole. 
Like Holthausen and Lacker, they also find that performance deteriorates over time.  
(Kracaw and Zenner 1996) study the announcement effects of buyouts on the stock prices 
of  targets  and  lending  banks  and  find  positive  wealth  effects  for  lending  banks  and  targets.  
Interestingly,  they  find  negative  wealth  effects  on  the  stock  prices  of  targets  of  leveraged 
recapitalizations.
24 (DeAngelo et al. 1984) also find that public shareholders gain about 22% in 
public-to-private buyouts.  
  (Lopez de Silanes et al. 2010) study a large sample of buyout transactions and their deal-
level returns. They find that 10% of deals result in bankruptcy while 25% of them have an IRR 
over 50%. They also find a negative relationship between deal-level returns (IRRs) and the size of 
the funds investing in them: the median IRR of investments held by the top decile BO firms is 
16% while investments held by the bottom decile firms have a 36% median IRR. The authors 
argue that diseconomies of scale are significant in the BO industry. (Groh and Gottschalg 2009), 
using a data set of 133 US buyouts, construct a mimicking levered public equity portfolio for 
each  deal  (using  deal-specific  debt-to-equity  ratios)  and  show  that  many  such  mimicking 
portfolios  default  during  the  holding  period.  Their  results  highlight  the  difficulty  of  proper 
benchmarking for BO returns.   
4.1.4   Asset-class-level returns  
Several vendors have developed VC and BO indices by aggregating either fund-level or deal-
level data.
25  This enables researchers to estimate risk-adjusted performance of VC or BO as an 
asset class using standard factor models. However, returns thus constructed still suffer from a 
stale price problem:  company valuations are updated infrequently and only when companies 
                                                 
24 In contrast, (Gupta and Rosenthal 1991) study leverage recaps and find positive abnormal returns to shareholders.   
25 Cambridge Associates publishes CA VC and PE index that are based on fund cash flow data. Dow Jones publishes 
DowJones Index of Venture Capital (formerly Sand Hill Index) that is based on deal-level data.    25 
either receive new rounds of financing (in cases of VC) or have exits. Not addressing stale price 
issues leads to underestimated beta and over-estimated alpha. (Woodward 2009), (Metrick and 
Yasuda 2010b), and (Barber and Yasuda 2010) address this problem by including lagged values 
of  factor  returns  in  the  regressions  and  sum  over  the  estimated  coefficients  across  lags.
26 
Consistent with stale prices, lagged factor returns (especially market returns) are often significant 
explanatory variables. Market betas estimated this way are approximately 1 for BO and 2 for VC, 
and alphas are not significantly different from zero for either asset class.  
4.1.5    Summary 
The evidence on whether VC and BO funds achieve excess performance is mixed. This is due to 
several  reasons.  First,  many  of  the  studies  that  employ  fund-level  cash  flow  data  make  an 
effective  assumption  that  market  beta  for  the  asset  class  is  1,  which  may  or  may  not  be 
appropriate. Studies using deal-level data or index returns and explicitly estimating market beta 
while correcting for other data issues (e.g., sample selection, stale prices) tend to obtain beta 
estimates closer to 2 for VC, and around 1for BO; more data and more studies with innovative 
methodology can further improve the precision of these estimates. Second, some studies use self-
reported portfolio values as updated by GPs to gauge performance, which may be subject to stale 
price problems. When these self-reported values are marked to market, as done in (Gompers and 
Lerner 1997), it has a large positive effect on risk measures such as beta. Similarly, when lagged 
market returns are included, estimated betas are far larger than when they are not included. Third, 
in case of BO, it is difficult to adjust for the leverage risk that may vary from deal to deal and 
from fund to fund. Even if the average BO beta exposure is close to 1, it may not be uniform 
across  funds,  and  cross-sectional  performance  variation  may  or  may  not  be  coming  from 
differences in the levels of systematic risk (via leverage or otherwise) taken by individual funds. 
These and other known data issues (such as stale prices, illiquidity premium, selection bias, and 
                                                 
26 (Asness et al. 2001).   26 
missing data on defunct dates) likely account for the mixed results thus far in the literature. 
Solving methodological challenges and/or overcoming data limitations, and reconciling existing 
findings towards a more unified understanding of private equity performance is an important 
remaining research agenda in this strand of the literature.  
4.2  Performance Persistence and Sources of Performance 
 
One  distinguishing  feature  of  private  equity  as  an  asset  class  is  the  evidence  on 
performance persistence not only at the GP level but also at the LP and the entrepreneur level (in 
case of VC). (Kaplan and Schoar 2005) document that GPs whose funds outperform the industry 
in one fund are likely to outperform the industry in the next and vice versa.  The persistence is 
found not only between two consecutive funds but also between the current fund and the second 
previous fund. Persistence is found in both VC and BO, but is stronger in VC. (Metrick and 
Yasuda 2010a) provide an explanation and supporting empirical evidence as to why persistence is 
weaker in BO: when BO fund managers gain experience, they increase the size of their funds 
much  faster  than  VC  fund  managers  do,  thereby  increasing  the  per-partner  capital  under 
management. In line with this explanation, (Marquez et al. 2010) argue that PE fund managers 
(and VC fund managers more than BO fund managers) with positive alpha allow their superior 
performance  to  persist  because  there  is  assortative  matching  between  funds  and  portfolio 
companies along this dimension. Because PE fund managers are incented to signal positive alpha 
to potential investees in order to be matched with the best firms, they are willing to not fully 
capture the surplus from their alphas by either increasing the fund size or their fees. (Hochberg et 
al. 2010b), on the other hand, argue that persistence results from the hold-up power of incumbent 
fund investors (limited partners).  
  In a different vein, (Lerner et al. 2007) examine the returns that institutional investors 
realize from private equity and find that endowments (and to a lesser degree public pensions) 
outperform other types of investors by a large margin. Part of the outperformance appears to be   27 
due to their better ability to select superior funds. Finally, (Gompers et al. 2010) study serial 
entrepreneurs and find that entrepreneurs who were successful in prior ventures are much more 
likely to succeed than others [also see (Gompers et al. 2009)]. One interpretation is that others 
perceive them to have skill and are more willing to commit resources.  Thus, success begets 
success and strengthens performance persistence.   
These results are markedly different from those in other asset classes such as mutual 
funds, and are thus striking. How the persistence result found at the GP level and at the LP level 
relates to one another is another interesting open question. At the first glance, it appears that high-
performing PE (and especially VC) firms are matched with sophisticated investors (endowments 
and public pension funds). However, (Phalippou 2010) argues that the performance persistence of 
VC funds as reported in (Kaplan and Schoar 2005) is mainly driven by unsophisticated investors; 
VC  funds  that  are  expected  to  be  backed  by  skilled  investors  do  not  exhibit  performance 
persistence  and  a  significant  flow-performance  relationship.  This  finding  is  at  odds  with  the 
simple matching story.  Richer evidence that sheds more light on the persistence phenomenon is 
warranted.  
  Below, we review the extant literature that examines both sources of performance and 
possible explanations for performance persistence for VC and BO.  We first review the studies 
that focus on VC and then on BO.  
Studies on the determinants of VC performance fall into two broad categories: those that 
examine how VC-company matching at times of investment leads to differentials in performance, 
and those that examine how VC’s post-investment activities (including exit decisions) are related 
to investment performance.   
Several studies document that established VCs exercise pricing power, which offers an 
explanation for the performance persistence phenomenon and seems particularly valuable in hot 
markets. Using a unique hand-collected sample of first-round recipient companies that received 
offers from multiple VCs, (Hsu 2004) finds that high-reputation VCs’ offers are three times more   28 
likely  to  be  accepted,  and  moreover  that  they  acquire  startup  equity  at  a  10-14%  discount. 
Reputation is measured as the number of past deals made in the startup’s industrial segment. The 
finding  suggests  that  start-ups  perceive  affiliation  with  high-reputation  VCs  to  have  positive 
effects on their firms’ performance, and are willing to share the rent with such VCs. The effect 
itself can be either certification, value-added, or both.     
  (Gompers  and  Lerner  2000)  find  that  competition  for  a  limited  number  of  attractive 
investments  leads  to  a  positive  relationship  between  capital  inflows  and  valuations  of  new 
investments.
27 While they find that changes in valuations are not related to the ultimate success of 
the firms, (Kaplan and Schoar 2005) find that market entry (the number of new funds entering the 
market, and thus similar to capital inflows) and fund performance are countercyclical [see also 
similar results in the context of European VC and BO investments in (Diller and Kaserer 2009)]. 
To the extent that higher valuations affect the division of exit values in entrepreneurs’ favor, but 
not the exit values, the two findings are reconcilable. Significantly, Kaplan and Schoar also find 
that the performance of funds raised by high-reputation VC firms (firms with more previous 
funds) is less sensitive to market entry. Combined, findings of these three studies suggest that 
reputable  VCs  avoid  the  negative  effects  of  capital  inflows  on  performance  by  successfully 
insisting on favorable investment terms even in hot markets. Consistent with this interpretation, 
(Gompers et al.  2008)  find  that  VC  firms  with  the  most  industry  experience  increase  their 
investments the most when public market signals become more favorable. Their investments are 
more responsive than firms with less industry experience, and the increased investment rate does 
not adversely affect subsequent success rates. 
  How do reputable VC firms sustain their pricing advantage?  Several studies argue that 
the  network  among  VCs  who  engage  in  repeated  transactions  with  each  other  through  deal 
syndication serves as a source of performance as well as barriers to entry. (Hochberg et al. 2007) 
find that funds run by better-networked VC firms perform significantly better (measured as better 
                                                 
27 Also see (Gompers 1994) and (Gompers and Lerner 1998b) for analysis of determinants of capital flows.    29 
successful exit rates). While a better network status can either be a source of better screening or 
conversely a result of better value-adding skills, (Hochberg et al. 2010a) further argue that VCs 
use networks as barriers to entry, and benefit by getting low prices for deals. (Hochberg et al. 
2010a)  also  find  that  more  densely  networked  markets  experience  less  entry,  and  document 
strategic  behavior  by  both  entrants  (who  try  to  enter  by  syndicating  with  incumbents)  and 
incumbents (who freeze out other incumbents that facilitate entry by newcomers).   
While a number of studies document how VCs’ monitoring activities affect VC-backed 
firms’  operational  characteristics  (e.g.,  board  composition,  earnings  quality,  and  personnel 
policy), as discussed in Section 3, few studies actually document a relationship between VCs’ 
post-investment activities and investment performance.
28 One exception is (Bottazzi et al. 2008) 
which, using a sample of European VC deals, find that companies that receive funding from more 
activist VCs are more successful. In another study, (Lindsey 2008) documents facilitation of 
strategic alliances among portfolio companies as a new value-added role of venture capitalists, 
and finds these alliances improve the probability of exit for VC-backed firms.  
Besides  monitoring  and  other  interim  activities,  post-investment  VC  activities  also 
include executing exits and distributing exit proceeds back to investors, and the literature offers 
some evidence of market-timing skill as a source of performance for VCs.  Using a sample of 
VC-backed biotech firms between 1978 and 1992, (Lerner 1994b) finds that companies go public 
when equity valuations are high, and that seasoned venture capitalists (a common measure of VC 
reputation in the literature) are particularly good at taking companies near market peaks. VC 
returns on investments are realized (and used to calculate fund returns and carry) not when the 
firms go public, but when the VCs decide to distribute the now-public stocks to their investors.
29  
Thus,  VCs’  abilities  to  time  the  public  stock  market  could  contribute  to  their  fund  returns. 
                                                 
28 One perennial problem is the difficulty of separating out the effects of sorting from the effects of value-added 
activities. See the discussion of (Sorensen 2007) below.  
29 Although it is also possible for the VCs to sell the fund’s stock holdings in the open market and distribute the cash 
proceeds to investors, it is more common practice for them to make in-kind distributions in cases of IPO exits. One 
reason is that as insiders of the firms, VCs’ sales of stocks are more restricted than sales by limited partners. Another is 
that some limited partners may prefer to receive in-kind distributions, thereby controlling the timing of liquidations.     30 
(Gompers and Lerner 1998a) examine a sample of in-kind distributions by VCs to their limited 
partners  and  find  evidence  that  VCs  use  inside  information  to  time  stock  distributions  after 
substantial price run-ups.  
  While  a  positive  relationship  between  VC  reputation  measures  and  investment 
performance is extensively documented, this could be due to either reputable VCs matching with 
higher ex-ante quality firms (because of better screening ability, better proprietary deal flow, 
better  network,  or  all  of  the  above),  or  reputable  VCs  possessing  better  monitoring  skills.  
Disentangling  the  two  effects  is  an  important  yet  challenging  research  goal.  A  standard 
econometric approach with instruments that affects VC reputation measure (e.g., experience) but 
does not affect investment outcome is difficult to find in the VC setting. For example, geography-
based  instruments  are  valid  in  other  contexts,  but  in  VC  investments,  proximity  affects 
effectiveness of monitoring and value-added activities, and thus cannot be excluded from the 
second-stage  equation.
30 Prior  to  this  realization,  several  papers  made  valiant  but  incomplete 
efforts to solve these problems. (Sorensen 2007) explicitly tackles this problem by using the 
identifying assumption that VCs and firms’ participation in a particular market, where the market 
is defined by a region-year pair, is exogenous and is independent of error terms in the model. 
Then, presence of other agents affects investment decisions and leads investors with differing 
experiences (reputation) to invest in companies with similar unobserved quality for exogenous 
reasons. Sorensen finds that the companies funded by more experienced VCs are more likely to 
go public (a success measure), and that sorting is almost twice as important as value-added in 
explaining the difference in IPO rates. 
  Finally, (Nahata 2008) proposes a new measure of VC reputation and shows it predicts 
performances of portfolio companies better than alternative measures.  His proposed measure is 
IPO capitalization share and is based on cumulative market capitalization of IPOs backed by the 
VC. Nahata argues that this measure captures both VC screening and monitoring expertise.  
                                                 
30 See (Chen et al. 2010) for geography of venture capital.    31 
Existing studies examining determinants of BO performance have tended to focus on two 
factors: whether BO reputation (or stronger relationships with banks) has positive effects on the 
fund  performance  via  better  debt  pricing,  and  whether  competition  (or  lack  thereof)  among 
bidders at the time of investments drives up (down) purchase prices.   
  Using a sample of 180 public-to-private LBOs, (Demiroglu and James 2010) find that 
reputable BO firms are better at market timing in credit markets (increasing deal activities more 
when credit spreads are low and lending standards are lax), and that they get better loan terms 
(lower  spreads,  longer  maturities,  higher  portions  of  institutional  loans).  Though  buyouts 
sponsored by reputable BO firms are more levered, the valuations they pay are not higher.  While 
Demiroglu and James do not provide a direct evidence on fund performance, the findings suggest 
that  reputable  BO  firms’  better  pricing  power  vis-à-vis  lenders  is  a  source  of  performance 
persistence in buyouts. Their findings on market timing and pricing power echo parallel findings 
on VC in (Hsu 2004) and (Gompers et al. 2008).
31 (Ivashina and Kovner 2010) document that BO 
firms with stronger bank relationships obtain better spreads and covenant terms. The results in 
Demiroglu and James and Ivashina and Kovner appear to be related, as there is likely to be a 
positive correlation between BO reputation and the strength of their relationships with lenders.     
  (Kaplan and Stein 1993) examine pricing and financial structure of large MBOs in the 
1980’s and find that over time the deals were struck with higher ratios of prices to cash flows, 
employing higher ratios of debt obligations to cash flows and more junk bonds as opposed to 
private debt, and more upfront monetary rewards for management teams and dealmakers.  Later-
period buyouts were more likely to experience defaults and costly financial distress, and Kaplan 
and Stein argue that overheating in the buyout market, driven by the demand for junk bonds, is 
the most likely explanation.
32    
                                                 
31 Note, however, that in case of VC the rent is extracted from entrepreneurs, whereas in case of BO the rent is 
extracted from lenders.  
32 Also see (Gompers 1998) for related evidence for VC in the late 1990’s.    32 
  Several recent studies examine determinants of the degree of competition among bidders 
and their effects on buyout performance in more recent buyout booms. These studies tend to 
focus on large, public-to-private transactions where it is common for the seller to receive multiple 
offers and banks are hired to assist in the bidding process.  In a theory paper, (Povel and Singh 
2010) analyze a recent phenomenon called “stapled finance”, whereby a seller arranges a pre-
packaged loan commitment for whoever wins the bidding contest, and show that stapled finance 
increases bidding competition and benefits the seller by increasing valuations, even though the 
seller would need to compensate the arranging bank for offering the loan.  The results suggest 
that buyers of stapled finance transactions perform worse than non-stapled finance transactions, 
ceteris  paribus.    Consistent  with  the  theoretical  prediction  of  Povel  and  Singh,  (Boone  and 
Mulherin 2009) find that staple financing is associated with increased competition, i.e., a greater 
number of firms making non-binding and binding private offers for the target firm.   
  Another aspect of the bidding process that received attention during the recent buyout 
boom is the so-called club deals or consortiums where multiple BO funds join forces to purchase 
a target firm as a consortium.
33 The evidence is mixed on the competitive effect of club deals. 
Examining  a  sample  of  U.S.  public-to-private  buyouts  conducted  by  prominent  BO  firms, 
(Officer et al.  2010)  find  that  club  deals  are  associated  with  lower  premiums  paid  to  target 
shareholders compared to solo-sponsored deals, especially among deals before 2006 and in target 
firms with low institutional ownership. Officer et al. argue that the most likely explanation is that 
club deals dampen competition and facilitate collusion.  In contrast, analyzing a sample of 870 
takeovers of publicly traded targets, (Boone and Mulherin 2009) find that, while target abnormal 
returns are somewhat lower in consortium deals in the short run, the results do not hold for longer 
event windows.  Boone and Mulherin also find that BO takeovers (both solo and consortium 
deals) are generally associated with greater degrees of competition than other types of bidders.  
                                                 
33 Other papers that examine potential conflicts of interests at BO firms include (Acharya and Johnson forthcoming) 
and (Fang et al. 2010). See (Gompers and Lerner 1999b), (Li and Masulis 2004), (Hamao et al. 2000), and (Hellmann 
et al. 2008) for related evidence on combining VC with investment banking and commercial banking.    33 
They thus reject the view that BO consortium deals facilitates collusion, which is at odds with 
Officer et al.’s conclusion. (Marquez and Singh 2010) present a theoretical model that shows that 
whether club deals hurt (via lower premiums paid) or benefit (via bundled value-adding expertise 
of multiple PE firms) target shareholders depend on both the number of potential bidders and 
bidding costs, thus suggesting that the extant empirical findings may be reconcilable.  
5  Contracts 
 
Contracts employed by VC and BO fund managers share many features. At the fund 
level, limited partnership agreements signed between GPs and LPs are structured quite similarly. 
Both VC and BO funds are closed-end, finite-life (typically 10 years) partnerships where GPs 
earn management fees annually as a pre-determined percentage of base capital (e.g., committed 
capital), and carried interest, which entitles GPs to (typically) 20% of the fund profit. Both types 
of funds restrict GPs’ activities (e.g., investments outside of funds, investments across funds, 
investment in asset classes other than private equity) through negative covenants.  
At the deal level, VC contracts and BO contracts appear to be more distinct from each 
other.    Specifically,  while  VC  investments  are  minority  stakes  and  typically  made  using 
convertible  securities,  and  financing  is  syndicated  and  staged  over  multiple  rounds,  BO 
investments are one-time acquisitions of controlling stakes and are typically financed using equity 
and debt. Note, however, the observation made by Sahlman (1990) that “[t]he debt used in LBOs 
is similar in function to the staged-capital-commitment process used in venture-capital deals; in 
neither is there much discretionary cash flow”. (p. 516) Thus, both types of deal structures are 
aimed at disciplining the portfolio company management by taking away excess cash flows from 
them. Both deal-level contracts also include features like board seats that facilitate monitoring 
and advising roles played by GPs.   34 
5.1  Contracts between Fund Managers and Investors 
Compared to the extensive literature on the contracts between VCs and their portfolio companies, 
the literature on the contracts between fund managers and their investors is relatively small. The 
earlier studies tend to focus on VCs, while the more recent papers are more likely to contain 
analyses of the buyout segment of the industry. (Sahlman 1990) was the first analysis of contracts 
between VC fund managers (GPs) and investors (LPs) [also see (Gompers and Lerner 1996)]. 
Typical structures of limited partnerships are described, summary statistics of a sample of 76 VC 
funds raised in 1986-87 are reported, and agency problems between GPs and LPs and contractual 
provisions in fund partnership agreements as potential remedies are discussed.   
  As discussed in Section 3, funds have a finite lifetime and VC and BO firms raise new 
funds every 3-5 years. Several papers examine the strategic choices made by GPs of new vs. 
follow-on funds. (Gompers 1996) finds evidence that young VC firms take portfolio companies 
public earlier than older VC firms in order to establish a reputation and successfully raise capital 
for new funds.  IPOs are timed to precede or coincide with raising money for follow-on funds. 
Similarly, (Ljungqvist et al. 2007) find that younger funds invest in riskier buyouts in an effort to 
establish a track record, whereas established funds act more strategically in response to market 
conditions.  
  (Gompers  and  Lerner  1999a)  find  that  the  pay  of  new  VC  funds  is  less  sensitive  to 
performance and varies less than that of older funds, which is consistent with a learning model 
rather  than  a  signaling  model.  (Chung  et  al.  2010)  present  a  learning-based  framework  for 
estimating total pay for performance, where pay for performance arises from both explicit pay 
earned via carried interest in the current fund and implicit pay from expected future fundraising. 
They find that implicit pay from future fundraising is stronger for BO funds (which are more 
scalable  than  VC  funds)  and  for  younger  funds  (for  which  current  performance  is  more 
informative about ability). Focusing on the lemons problem that arises when existing LPs face 
liquidity shocks and GPs need to raise funds from new investor, (Lerner and Schoar 2004) find   35 
that fund managers impose more transfer restrictions when raising new funds and also funds 
focused on industries with longer investment cycles.   
  (Axelson  et  al.  2009)  analyze  the  optimal  financing  structure  of  buyout  funds  that 
minimizes the agency conflicts between GPs and LPs and find that a mix of ex ante and ex post 
financing  achieves  the  second  best.
34  While  the  closed-end  fund  structure  with  carry 
compensation incents GPs to avoid overinvestment in good times, the deal-by-deal debt financing 
prevents them from making bad deals in bad times (when credit market conditions tighten).  The 
model explains pro-cyclicality of investment volumes and counter-cyclicality of performance in 
the buyout industry.   
Using detailed records on 238 funds raised between 1993 and 2006, (Metrick and Yasuda 
2010a) analyze and compare the features of venture capital and buyout fund contracts. The paper 
builds a model of expected GP revenue as a function of their contracts with LPs, modeling carry 
as an option-like position on the fund assets and incorporating as model parameters fees, carry, 
transaction and monitoring fees (in case of buyouts), as well as leverage, portfolio concentration, 
and  investment  risk.  About  two-thirds  of  expected  revenue  comes  from  fixed  revenue 
components  and  is  not  sensitive  to  performance.    BO  fund  managers  with  prior  experience 
increase the size of their follow-on funds significantly faster than VC fund managers do, and as a 
result BO fund managers’ per personnel revenue is higher than that of VC fund counterparts.  The 
results are consistent with greater scalability of BO business.  
While the partnership agreements share a number of similarities between VCs and BOs, 
including the fees and carry structures, there is one distinction between the two segments of 
private equity: the buyout funds charge various fees, such as transaction fees and monitoring fees, 
directly to portfolio companies, whereas VC funds do not. To the best of our knowledge no 
theory paper has explicitly examined implications of this practice in an agency model setting. 
(Metrick and Yasuda 2010a) conduct sensitivity analysis and show that, ceteris paribus, these fees 
                                                 
34 Also see (Campello and Da Matta 2010) for analysis of VC funds.     36 
make total GP compensation less sensitive to performance and become disproportionately large 
(relative to management fees and carry) when individual buyout transactions are financed with 
high  debt-to-equity  ratio  (because  these  fees  are  charged  on  enterprise  values  rather  than  on 
equity values). In a paper surveying the literature findings on performance and fee structures, 
(Phalippou  2009)  argues  that,  among  the  various  components  of  buyout  fund  managers’  fee 
arrangements with investors, transaction and monitoring fees are especially opaque. 
5.2  Contracts between Venture Capitalists and Portfolio Companies 
 
There is an extensive literature, both theoretical and empirical, that examines the features 
of contracts between venture capitalists and portfolio companies.
35  In part, the greater interest in 
VC-company contracts relative to those in BO-company contracts stems from the fact that the 
relationships between VCs and entrepreneurs resemble the theoretically pristine (but hard to find 
in practice) setup of principal-agent models that are used in much of the contract-theory literature 
[(Kaplan and Stromberg 2001)]. Thus, the VC setup offers a rare natural laboratory to test the 
implications of the theory of the firm without the usual confounding factors, e.g., the dispersed 
stock ownership and short-term pressures associated with publicly traded firms. That said, we 
note the dearth of papers on contracts used in buyout transactions and expect it to be a growth 
area in the literature.   
One of the most frequently analyzed features of the VC-company contracts is the use of 
convertible securities that combines the features of equity and debt. A number of studies offer 
(generally non-mutually exclusive) explanations for its prevalent use.
36 (Berglof 1994) analyzes 
the potential conflict of interests that arise from a future sale of the company to a third party.  On 
the one hand, an entrepreneur values private benefits of control that are increasing in the firm 
                                                 
35 For definitions and detailed explanations of features included in standard VC contracts, see, e.g., Sahlman (1990), 
Metrick  and  Yasuda  (2010b)  (Chapters  8  and  9),  as  well  as  the  model  term  sheet  on  NVCA’s  website, 
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=108&Itemid=136.  For  prevalence  of  various 
contract features in real-world contracts, see, e.g., Sahlman (1990), Kaplan and Stromberg (2003, 2004), and Dow 
Jones Venture Capital Deal Terms Report (6
th Edition, 2009).  
36 (Marx 1998), (Bergemann and Hege 1998)(Trester 1998), (Kirilenko 2001), and (Cornelli and Yosha 2003).   37 
value and is afraid of a sale that compensates him insufficiently for their loss; on the other hand, a 
VC is afraid of a premature, “cheap exit” that results in a poor return on her financial investment, 
but would be enticing for the entrepreneur to accept.  Since one conflict is more likely in good 
states of the world and another in bad states of the world, convertible securities (either convertible 
debt or convertible preferred stock) with contingent transfer of control to the vulnerable party 
emerges  as  the  optimal  security  that  best  protects  the  two  initial  contracting  parties  against 
dilution and expropriation from the future buyer.  The findings are consistent with the practice; in 
the U.S., nearly all the VC investments are made with preferred stock, either with conversion 
feature, or in combination with common stock, so that VCs receive the downside protection of 
debt in poor states of the world, and the upside potential of equity in good states of the world.    
  In contrast to Berglof’s focus on the allocation of control rights, (Schmidt 2003) argues 
that incentive properties of convertible securities — effort incentives for the entrepreneur and the 
VC — are crucial in explaining why they are almost always used in VC transactions while very 
rarely used by banks or other outside investors that finance small businesses. They show that 
convertible security achieves the first best investment outcomes (relative to standard debt-equity 
contracts) when the investor’s costly effort is important
37 for the success of the startup; hence, it 
is used in venture capital finance where extra-financial value of VC backing is important, but not 
in bank financing where banks are passive investors.  
  (Hellmann 2006) argues that the key property of convertible preferred stock used in VC 
transactions is that it (typically) requires forced conversion of preferred stock to common stock 
upon IPO exits, but not upon exits by acquisitions. The most commonly used type of convertible 
preferred stock is participating convertible preferred (PCP),
38 which allows holders to “double-
dip”,  i.e.,  receive  both  the  debt-like  payoff  (redemption  value)  and  the  equity-like  payoff 
(participation  value)  as  long  as  the  security  remains  unconverted.    In  most  VC  contracts, 
                                                 
37 Also see (Casamatta 2003) and (Repullo and Suarez 2004). 
38 See Metrick and Yasuda (2010b), Chapter 9, for different types of preferred stock used in VC transactions.    38 
conversion of preferred stock to common is forced (“automatic conversion”) rather than voluntary 
in cases of an exit via an IPO.  Thus, PCP with automatic conversion upon IPOs effectively 
allocates more cash flow rights to VCs in exits via acquisitions than in IPO exits. Hellmann 
argues that this is optimal in a model with double moral hazard, where both the entrepreneur and 
the VC provide value-adding effort. In a related paper, (Bengtsson 2009) finds that restrictive 
covenants  are  more  prevalent  in  contracts  with  debt-like  payoffs  (i.e.,  PCP)  as  compared  to 
simple convertible preferred that resembles equity more closely. (Cumming 2008) also shows that 
stronger VC control rights are more likely to lead to exits by acquisitions rather than by write-offs 
or IPOs.   
Another  feature  of  VC-company  contracts  that  has  drawn  significant  attention  in  the 
literature is that a VC’s total investment in a company is often staged over time and follow-on 
investments  are  either  implicitly  or  explicitly  conditional  on  reaching  milestones.
39 (Gompers 
1995) argues that this contractual feature protects VCs against inefficient continuation of the 
project by entrepreneurs and thus is most valuable when liquidation values are hurt the most from 
inefficient continuation, and finds empirical evidence in support of this argument.  Specifically, 
Gompers analyzes a sample of 794 VC-backed companies’ investment history and finds that 
more frequent financing rounds (shorter duration between rounds) are associated with high levels 
of agency costs (measured by, e.g., the ratio of intangible to total assets, the market-to-book ratio, 
and R&D intensity).  
(Admati and Pfleiderer 1994) also analyze stage financing and show that a fixed-fraction 
contract where the insider VC always receives a fixed fraction of the equity of the company in all 
financing  rounds  induces  the  inside  investor  (the  initial  VC)  to  make  optimal  investment 
decisions.
40 In a related paper, (Fluck et al. 2004) argue that, without syndication, the holdup cost 
exceeds the efficiency gain of staged financing. While staged financing reduces the agency cost 
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of inefficient continuation of unpromising projects, it gives too much bargaining power to early-
stage  venture  capitalists  and  leads  to  dilution  of  entrepreneurs’  stake  ex  post,  unless  staged 
financing  is  combined  with  pre-agreed  syndication  of  later-stage  investments.  The  results 
highlight  the  complementarity  of  staged  financing  and  syndication,  two  somewhat  distinct 
features of VC investments.  
  In  another  study  examining  bargaining  between  VCs  and  entrepreneurs  in  staged 
financing, (Inderst et al. 2007) argue that staged financing, combined with the closed-fund feature 
of VC partnerships (whereby the fund size, or the “depth of the investor’s pocket”, is fixed) and 
the fact that a fund finances a portfolio of projects, may lead not only to improved bargaining 
power for the VC, but also to improved incentives for entrepreneurs.  The results suggest that 
staged financing and the fund structure where multiple portfolio companies compete for a fixed 
amount of capital are complementary.  
  (Kaplan and Stromberg 2003) analyze actual VC contracts in light of contracting theory 
and find that VC contracts allow separate allocations of cash flow rights, board rights, voting 
rights, liquidation rights, and other control rights among stakeholders.  (Kaplan and Stromberg 
2004)  relate  expected  post-investment  actions  by  VCs  to  contracts  and  find  that  greater  VC 
control is associated with increased management intervention while greater VC equity incentives 
are associated with increased value-added effort.  
  Other studies focus on less studied aspects of VC-company contracts. (Hellmann 1998) 
studies why entrepreneurs give up control rights over to VC, exposing them to the risk of being 
fired before their shares are fully vested.  A key ingredient of the model is that entrepreneurs may 
take  non-contractible  actions  that  increase  their  private  benefits  of  control,  while  venture 
capitalists may make non-contractible (and costly) efforts to search for a good management team.  
Equilibrium  conditions  are  derived  where  entrepreneurs  voluntarily  relinquish  control  and 
knowing that venture capitalists are incented to search for a superior outside management team.    40 
  (Field  and  Hanka  2001)  examine  a  sample  of  VC-company  contracts  with  post  IPO 
lockup clauses, which prohibit insiders from selling their shares in the open market for a preset 
period  of  time  (e.g.,  6  months)  after  the  IPO  date.    Expiration  of  lockups  results  in  large 
permanent  increases  in  trading  volumes  and  abnormal  negative  returns  around  the  lockup 
expiration date. (Broughman and Fried 2010) examine whether cash flow rights are renegotiated 
between entrepreneurs and VCs by studying sales of Silicon Valley firms.   Results suggest VCs 
sometime concede cash-flow rights and allow common shareholders to receive payment before 
VCs’ liquidation preferences are satisfied, especially when the firm’s choice of corporate law 
gives shareholders more power to hold up the sale.  
  More recently, researchers have started to examine determinants of both time-series and 
cross-country variation in contract terms.  (Inderst and Muller 2004) build an equilibrium model 
in which capital-market characteristics affect the relative supply and demand for VC capital, 
which  in  turn  affects  bargaining  between  entrepreneurs  and  VCs,  which  in  turn  affects  the 
valuation  and  relative  ownership  shares  of  VCs  and  entrepreneurs.  The  model  explains  the 
cyclicality  of  the  VC  industry  and  in  particular  the  Internet  boom  and  bust  period  in  which 
entrepreneurs enjoyed high valuations and retained large equity shares during the boom, whereas 
venture capitalists obtained much larger ownership shares and demanded low valuations during 
the bust.   
Several  papers  empirically  study  the  effects  of  legal  regimes  on  VC  contracts  using 
international data and offer somewhat mixed evidence.
41 (Kaplan et al. 2007) examine features of 
international  VC  contracts  and  find  that  legal  regimes  affect  contractual  features  more  when 
investors  are  inexperienced,  but  that  more  experienced  VCs  implement  U.S.-style  contracts 
regardless of legal regime. Use of U.S.-style contracts is associated with lower failure rates of VC 
firms, even controlling for VC experience, suggesting efficiency of U.S. style contracts even in 
non-U.S. markets. Similarly, (Bottazzi et al. 2009) find that the legal system in the target country 
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does not explain contract provisions after controlling for VC home country effects. In contrast, 
(Lerner  and  Schoar  2005)  study  international  PE  contracts  (which  include  both  VC  and  BO 
investments)  and  find  that,  while  convertible  preferred  stock  with  covenants  are  favored 
contractual choices in high-enforcement and common law nations, majority equity ownership 
combined with debt and board control are often used in low-enforcement and civil law nations. 
They argue that the legal system constrains the ability of private parties to write contracts that are 
complex or state contingent. Similarly, (Balcarcel et al. 2010) find that both capital flows and 
investment patterns systematically vary with the rule of law variables of the target countries.  
5.3   Contracts between Buyout Investors and Portfolio Companies 
Researchers know relatively little about the contractual relationships between buyout investors 
and portfolio companies, due in part to data limitations that appear to be even more severe for 
buyouts than those for VC contracts. Here we review a small group of empirical papers that 
provide  evidence  suggestive  of  potential  agency  conflicts  between  BO  fund  managers  and 
investors during hot markets.   
In one of the earlier studies examining financial structure and pricing of public-to-private 
buyout transactions in the 1980’s, (Kaplan and Stein 1993) find that, over time, as the junk bond 
market took off and record amounts were issued, both the buyout investors and the management 
teams took more money out of transactions up-front. 
One  distinct  contractual  difference  between  the  BO  and  VC  fund  managers’ 
compensation is that BO fund managers routinely charge to their portfolio companies upfront 
transaction fees at the time of the investment as well as on-going monitoring fees.  These fees are 
distinct from management fees that GPs charge to the investors of the funds, and may be shared 
with investors and/or used to offset the management fees. Incentive effects of these portfolio 
company fees are not well understood, though anecdotal evidence suggests that at the height of   42 
the latest BO boom of 2003-2007, they comprised a very significant portion of the GPs’ total 
revenues, especially at larger funds.  
  (Metrick and Yasuda 2010a) build a model that estimates expected present values of PE 
manager  fee  revenues  as  functions  of  the  fund  fee  structure,  firm  characteristics,  and  deal 
structures (such as leverage and the portfolio company fee structure).  While the expected values 
of portfolio company fees (the sum of transaction fees and monitoring fees) are only a third of 
expected carry when the leverage ratio is 1:1, they increase to nearly 90% of expected carry when 
the  leverage  ratio  is  increased  to  4:1.
42   As  these  fees  are  less  risky  and  less  sensitive  to 
performance than carried interest, larger portfolio company fees associated with higher leverage 
suggests that leverage might weaken monitoring incentives of BO fund managers to maximize 
firm value and earn carry.  
Using a sample of 1,157 buyout transactions from 1980 to 2008, (Axelson et al. 2010) 
show that the economy-wide cost of borrowing rather than industry-specific characteristics is the 
main driver of the buyout leverage [also see (Brinkhuis and De Maeseneire 2009) for similar 
findings using a sample of European buyouts]. Credit market conditions also have a strong effect 
on prices paid in buyouts, and moreover use of high leverage in transactions negatively affects 
fund  performance.  Combined  with  the  results  of  (Kaplan  and  Stein  1993)  and  (Metrick  and 
Yasuda 2010a), these findings suggest that agency problems between buyout fund mangers and 
their investors may be exacerbated when cheap debt is available and allows fund managers to 
pocket large fees upfront.  Clearly more research is needed to understand contractual patterns in 
BO transactions.  
6  Conclusion 
 
VC and BO funds are financial intermediaries that invest in private companies, take an active role 
in monitoring and advising investee companies, exit investments through a sale or an IPO, and 
                                                 
42 Leverage directly impacts relative values of portfolio company fees, because these fees are paid as a percentage of 
the total enterprise value of the firm, whereas BO funds invest only in the equity portions of the firm’s capital structure.    43 
whose goal is to maximize present values of their current and future fund revenues (earned via 
management fees and carried interest). VCs are specialists whose superior screening capability 
for  high-growth,  risky  start-up  firms  in  high-tech  sectors  helps  alleviate  the  underinvestment 
problem that arises from the severe information asymmetry between informed entrepreneurs and 
uninformed investors. In contrast, economic rationale for BO specialists, especially those that are 
engaged primarily in private-to-private transactions and do not require high leverage, is not well 
understood. More research is needed to improve our understanding of how generic BO funds 
emerge in the economy. Both VC and BO-backing is associated with significant changes in the 
ways the investee companies are operated, including more independent and hands-on boards, 
higher earnings quality, and higher CEO turnover.  
Evidence on existence of excess performance (and its persistence) in private equity is 
mixed. This is due in part to significant data limitations and methodological challenges required 
to overcome the data limitations. Naïve applications of standard approaches to asset pricing tend 
to produce overestimates of alphas and underestimates of market beta. Valiant attempts have been 
made to correct for various aspects of data problems, including stale prices, infrequency of return 
realizations, sample selection, and missing observations, especially in the VC literature where 
data availability is better and the literature dates back longer. In comparison, the literature on BO 
performance is more nascent and the body of research working on this topic is expected to grow 
significantly.  
As VCs are thought to emerge as solutions to the underinvestment problem arising from 
information  asymmetry  between  entrepreneurs  and  uninformed  investors,  it  is  natural  that 
contracts used in VC transactions have features that address many potential agency problems. The 
literature has analyzed, among other features, use of convertible securities, staged financing, and 
syndication. The use of leverage as a disciplinary device to constrain the use of excess cash is 
emphasized as the economic rationale of leveraged buyouts, but the economic purpose of non-
leveraged  buyout  transactions  is  not  well  established:    the  contract  (and  other  economic)   44 
mechanisms  that  address  agency  issues  in  these  non-leveraged  transactions  remain  an  open 
question. Finally, contracts between VC and BO fund managers (GPs) and their investors (LPs) 
also address various agency issues. Since LPs do not monitor GPs on the day-to-day basis, their 
contracts are designed to best align their interests, via use of profit-sharing agreement (carried 
interest),  closed-end,  finite-life  fund  structure,  limited  reinvestments,  and  explicit  negative 
covenants preventing GPs from taking excessive risk and/or diverting efforts away from funds.  
Recent studies suggest that these features of contracts between LPs and GPs dynamically affect 
fund performance and performance persistence. Improving our understanding of the interactions 
between  GP  incentives  (that  are  determined  by  the  fund  structure)  and  fund  performance  is 
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Source: (Metrick and Yasuda 2010b), Exhibit 1-2.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Private Equity and Hedge Funds 
 
This figure illustrates the overlapping structure of the four main types of private equity 
investing  and  also  shows  the  intersection  of  these  types  with  hedge  funds,  another 


















Comparison of typical VC/PE fund terms with those of hedge funds and mutual funds 
 
This chart compares typical fund terms of venture capital and buyout funds with those of 
hedge funds and mutual funds.  An “open-end” fund can issue and redeem shares at any 
time (subject to lockups and waiting periods in case of hedge funds). A “finite-life” fund 
is obligated to terminate and liquidate its holdings at a pre-specified date.   Reinvestments 
refer  to  use  of  fund  distributions  in  order  to  invest  in  new  or  existing  portfolio 
companies/assets.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 